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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
With the prediction by the United Nations that 60% of the world’s population will live in cities by
the year 2030, it is apparent that the immediate global future is one of urbanisation. Central to
the environmental and energy security as well as risk assessment in critical Infrastructures must
therefore be the increasing domination of the cities. This population growth, needed economic
growth, and social pressures for improved infrastructure coupled to the need for human health
and ecological protection and environmental as well as energy security make systematic and
transparent  decision  making  a  complex  and  often  difficult  task  because  of  the  several
interdependencies of critical infrastructures. Evaluating complex technical data and developing
risk management options requires implementation of standardization and embedded systems of
information and communication technologies. In accordance to literature review, experience has
demonstrated that direct transposition of risk assessment and risk management frameworks
(e.g. those developed in the United States and European Union) may not work in regions whose
social,  legal,  historical,  political  and  economic  situations  are  not  suitable  or  prepared  for
acceptance of these methodologies. This paper reviews basic concepts defined in the field of
urban security in Critical  Infrastructures and extends its perception under the cross-sectoral
aspect of standardization and harmonization in the involved technological areas. What are the
defining characteristics that would ensure a city can not only survive in a manner acceptable to
its current and future inhabitants, but also in a way that will not undermine the standardized and
harmonized  technologies  and  policies  in  national,  European  and  international  level.  The
existence  of  several  EU  seventh  framework  projects,  specifically  those  relating  to  urban
resilience and security could be used to feed into this direction.
Keywords:  Security,  Critical  Infrastructure  Protection  (CIP),  Standardisation,  Harmonisation,
Resilience,  Risk  Assessment,  Interdependencies,  Urbanisation,  European   Union  policies,
Construction Regulations, Vulnerability.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 National Critical Infrastructure
The European Union defines a critical infrastructure as “an asset, system or part thereof located
in  Member States which is  essential  for  the maintenance of  vital  societal  functions,  health,
safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of
which would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain
those functions.” 1 The USA Patriot Act2 defines a critical infrastructure as “systems and assets,
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security,
national public health or safety, or any combination of  those matters.” A number of nations,
CEST2015_01442
such as Australia,  Canada,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  the Netherlands and United Kingdom use
similar  definitions.  The  governance  and  resilience  of  these  critical  infrastructures  and  their
critical  services  require  prevention,  preparation,  incident  management  and  fast  recovery
measures. For that reason governments identify what they regard to be critical Infrastructure
sectors, and the related critical products, services and assets. The early Green Paper by the
European Commission on critical  infrastructures contains an example  list  of  critical  sectors,
products  and services.3  For  the  critical  Information and Communication  Technologies  (ICT)
sector,  seven products  and  services  are  listed:  Information system and network  protection,
Instrumentation  automation  and  control  systems  (SCADA etc.),  Internet,  Provision  of  fixed
telecommunications,  Provision  of  mobile  telecommunications,  Radio  communication  and
navigation, Satellite communication, and Broadcasting.
The USA recognises eighteen critical infrastructure sectors including Communication sector and
the IT sector. The critical Communication sector comprises wireline, wireless, satellite,  cable
and broadcasting infrastructures; the critical IT sector comprises the provision of IT products
and  services,  incident  management  capabilities,  domain  name  resolution  services,  identity
management  and associated trust  support  services,  Internet-based content,  information and
communication services, and Internet routing, access and connection services.
1.2 Urban Critical Infrastructures and resilience
Globally, 80% of the largest cities are vulnerable to severe impacts of natural disasters like
earthquakes, and 60% are at risk from storm surges and tsunamis, and all face new impacts of
climate change. The goals of any sustainable development policies agenda must ensure that
even the most modest development gains are protected against losses incurred through natural
and human-induced disaster and crisis. Development within planetary boundaries is one of the
main  priority  challenges  of  sustainable  development.  Climate  change  adaptation  and  the
adoption of low carbon and efficient energy strategies and technologies will play a critical role in
meeting this challenge. Some of the greatest strides in this area will be made in cities, where
energy efficiency measures in urban planning, buildings, and transport, and in the production of
goods  and  services  and  the  design  of  products,  can  both  mitigate  existing  environmental
concerns and contribute to new economic and job opportunities. All the above topics will  be
main issues for the agenda of United Nations Habitat III conference in 2016.
Any combined effort and/or dialogue for harmonization and standardization in urban CIP and
resilience  should  bring  together  member  states,  national  and  local  governments,  urban
planners, private sector, and other actors to discuss how cities build resilience in the face of
uncertainty to protect lives and livelihoods, ensure continuity of services, and improve equitable
living  conditions.  This  effort  should  also  focus  on  how  cities  can  overcome  capacity
gaps/constraints to develop and achieve resilience targets and ‘do more with what they have’.
The relative policies should empowering “Inclusive, Productive and Resilient cities”. Specifically,
all  cities  should  prepare  themselves  to  be  “socially  inclusive,  economically  productive,
environmentally sustainable, secure, and resilient to climate change and other risks”. Achieving
this requires the development of participatory, accountable, and effective city governance “to
support rapid and equitable urban transformation”. A holistic approach to urban resilience that
considers all functions of an urban system can contribute to making all cities more equitable
places to live and work. A European as well as international dialogue will also aim to achieve the
following objectives:
•  Demonstrate  a  correlation  between  urban  resilience  and  economic  inclusiveness  and
development;
• Introduce new, innovative structural and non-structural approaches to building urban resilience
that contributes to a more equitable urban environment;
• Make the business case for cross-sectoral investments in urban resilience using examples of
how micro-finance, insurance, transport, affordable housing, and renewable/low carbon energy
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industries are enabling the urban poor to build resilience to natural and man-made hazards and
conditions, and realize new growth opportunities;
•  Demonstrate  how  cities  can  overcome  capacity  constraints  to  effectively  develop  and
implement a resilience action plan.
Resilience is a cross cutting theme that, if approached in a coherent and holistic manner, can
address and reduce social, economic, and environmental inequalities in urban areas. In this
way,  resilience  is  both  a  protector  of  development  gains,  as  well  as  a  conduit  for  future






It is necessary to include potential resilience themes covered in the above dialogue, like:
• Water and sanitation
• Food security
• Youth empowerment and engagement
• Equitable housing and infrastructure finance
• Transport.
2. SECURITY IN URBAN CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES 
2.1. European and International efforts
For the first time, more than 50% of the world's population lives in urban areas. In 1950, 30% of
people were urban dwellers;  by 2050 this figure is to rise to 70%. This  trend brings with it
increased security and safety threats in urban areas. The increased risk of catastrophic events,
whether accidental or deliberate, or by way of natural disasters, means there is now more so
than  ever  before,  a  need  to  ensure  the  resilience  of  our  cities.  Large  scale  urban  built
infrastructure is a critical node within the intertwined networks of urban areas, which include not
only  physical  components,  but  also  integrated  hardware  and  software  aspects.  To date,  a
comprehensive and holistic approach to improve the resilience and security of large scale urban
developments  against  attacks  and disruptions  has not  been developed  thoroughly. A lot  of
EUFP7 projects like HARMONISE, VITRUV, RIBS and DESURBS among others are generated
for the specific topics.
It is generally accepted that we do need a holistic approach to Urban Security and Resilience.
To date there is no comprehensive, holistic approach to improve resilience and security of large
scale urban built  infrastructure; this is a situation which is not helped by the lack of a clear
definition of what amounts to urban resilience. Vulnerabilities to terrorism and natural disasters
of our urban areas, together with the mechanisms to address them, continue to be studied, yet
no holistic approach has been formulated to develop a systematic approach to the design and
planning  of  large  scale  urban  built  infrastructure  with  resilience  in  mind.  Cities  have  been
identified, by Bugliarelio,1 as being ‘target rich’ environments, within the context of terrorism;
however, cities are just  as susceptible to natural  disasters.  In 2010,  for  the first  time since
records began,  natural  catastrophes,  such as floods,  storms and earthquakes caused more
damage (human and economic) than manmade disasters. There is, now more so than ever
before, a need for a holistic approach to urban resilience, with an emphasis on having the tools
in place which are capable of dealing with all challenges, whether man-made or natural.
 
The  typical  responses  taken  by  authorities  when  dealing  with  issues  relating  to  resilience
traditionally revolve around physical measures, such as modifications or retrofitting of at-risk
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buildings, combined with an increase in security personnel. Such measures are typically aimed
at tackling issues relating to some form of attack, usually of the more traditional terrorist type,
and, as such, are less compatible at dealing with natural disasters and their aftermath. The
severity of both terrorism and natural disasters or threatening events over the course of the last
decade has prompted a requirement for buildings and related infrastructure to offer not only
resistance, but functional capacity (e.g. safe shelter and critical operations) after a destructive
incident. In this respect the concept of ‘resilience’ has become an increasingly utilized metaphor
within  the  policy-making  process  and  in  the  expanding  institutional  framework  of  national
security, disaster preparedness and mitigation.
In  relation  to  urban  resilience,  the  objective  must  be  to  mitigate  the  impact  and  sustain
functionality for as far as is practically possible. To achieve this there is a requirement to have
the  conditions  in  place  so  that  unforeseen  outcomes  can  nonetheless  be  accommodated
accurately  and  immediately  through  collective  problem  solving  with  improvisation  and
innovation.  Resilience therefore in this context refers to a system’s  capacity “to continue its
existence,  or  to  remain  more or less stable,  in  the face of  surprise,  either  a deprivation of
resources or a physical threat”.5 Within the built environment literature, resilience of the ‘urban
form’ comprising buildings and related infrastructures has been traditionally construed as being
primarily concerned with protection and recovery from natural hazards. Depicting the evolving
and  increasingly  complex  nature  of  modern  day  security  challenges  the  terminology  of
resilience – the ability of the urban system to ‘bounce-back’ - have therefore assumed a dual
guise,  encompassing the twin threats and challenges of  climate change in parallel  with the
development of modernist counter-terrorism initiatives.
A representative example in new building concepts protecting against human-induced disaster,
especially  in cases of aircraft  impact,  indicates that  we have to taking account aspects like
subsequent  kerosene  fire  of  be  considered  as  realistic  threat  against  critical  infrastructure.
Typical  examples  are  high-rise  buildings  in  the  range  of  several  hundred  meters  altitude,
potentially  as  part  of  a  large  scale  urban  development,  housing  several  ten  thousands  of
occupants in  office and/or residential  space.  The largest  of  these buildings  worldwide carry
symbolic value making them susceptible to attacks. Furthermore, major nuclear facilities have to
be considered, especially those designed about 2-3 decades ago without or with low protection
requirements against accidental aircraft impact The two recently developed comprehensive and
innovative concepts of these building types, based on high performance (HPC) and ultra-high
performance  concretes  (UHPC).  The  most  sophisticated  method  to  calculate  the  local
resistance of a reinforced concrete building component for the loading case aircraft crash is with
respect  to  the  DIN  25449  the  use  of  modified,  empirical  punching  strength  evidence.  The
deviation  of  the  corresponding  factors  is  quite  complex  and  includes  a  certain  amount  of
uncertainties that are not part of this study to analyze or to mention.
Under the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) Research and Technical Development
project on urban security and resilience being carried out across Europe there are opportunities
for  integration.  The  development  of  an  integrated  approach  to  urban  resilience  and  the
advancement of a holistic approach should encompass a methodological framework. Through
the  application  of  a  real  life  case  study  module  within  the  methodology,  a  more  thorough
examination  of  any  proposed  interactive  semantic  intelligence  platform is  needed.  Each  of
sampled  specific  case  studies  would  have  to  be  chosen  with  a  focus  on  large-scale
buildings/building  complexes/building  arrangements  such  as  shopping  centres/areas,  sports
venues or combinations of business centres with underground transportation nodes; etc. Any
selected case studies should be representative of the diversity among the built urban form. This
will allow a comprehensive assessment and iterative development process in terms of the tools
that will be developed while providing a robust test-bed for the integrated information platform to
be  developed.  The  state  of  the  art  built  infrastructure  protection  products  and
planning/engineering  tools  currently  practiced/envisaged  at  these  case  study  areas  will  be
analyzed to identify existing constraints, shortfalls and capability gaps.
CEST2015_01442
Physical,  cyber and personnel security generally remain separate in many organisations. An
holistic security methodology provide a better understanding of overall organisational security
risks by applying converged governance and risk management across all assets. In combination
with  programme  for  security  risk  management  expertise,  such  approach  ensures  better
protection for assets, staff and information. The benefits of the holistic security approach are:
• Understand where gaps exist between security ‘layers’
•  Bridge  the  gap  between  the  ‘hard’  side  of  security  (technical/physical)  and  the  ‘soft’
(information/policy/ processes/people)
• Identify where security measures are being duplicated and are therefore wasteful
• Ensure investment is in proportion to risk levels
• Make security a strategic differentiator rather than a tax on the business
• Target resources where they deliver maximum benefit for every organisation.
2.2. Environmental security and CIP
Population growth, needed economic growth, and social pressures for improved infrastructure
coupled to the need for human health and ecological  protection and environmental  security
make systematic and transparent environmental decision making
a complex and often difficult task. Evaluating complex technical data and developing feasible
risk  management  options  requires  procedural  flexibility  that  may  not  be  part  of  existing
evaluative structures. Experience has demonstrated that direct transposition of risk assessment
and risk management frameworks (e.g. those developed in the United States and European
Union) may not work in regions whose social, legal, historical, political and economic situations
are not suitable or prepared for acceptance of these methodologies. Flexible decision-making,
including the use and development  of  acceptable  or  unacceptable  risk levels  based on the
critical nature of an infrastructure type, is one potential approach to assist risk managers in their
decision-making.  Unfortunately,  the  newness  of  the  discussions  on  the  interrelatedness  of
environmental  security  and  critical  infrastructure  has  yet  to  produce  a  unified  and
comprehensive treatment of the fields Environmental security has emerged as an increasingly
important concern of governments and their defense establishments because of several trends
that  have  the  potential  to  threaten  stability.  These  potential  threat  issues  include:  world
population in 2015 will be 7.2 billion, up from 6.1 billion in year 2000; water scarcities and
allocation will  pose challenges to certain governments; groundwater depletion; contemporary
environmental problems will  persist  and grow; globalization will  be rocky, marked by chronic
financial volatility and a widening economic divide; significant degradation of arable land; loss of
tropical forests; greenhouse gas emissions will increase substantially; exacerbation of biological
species loss; rapid urbanization; increasingly serious urban air and water quality problems; and
global  climate  change  induced  glacial  ice  melt  backs,  sea level  rise,  and  increasing  storm
frequency 
“Environmental Security” is an ill-defined term (McNeil 2000) with many definitions whose two
key elements are: repairing damage to the environment for human life support and for the moral
value of the environment itself; and, preventing damage to the environment from attacks and
other  forms  of  human  abuse.  Several  definitions  of  environmental  security  exist  and
demonstrate that  after  more than two decades of  discussion,  the concept  of  environmental
security  still  has  no  widely  agreed  upon  formulation  (McNeil  2000).  The  discipline  of
“environmental security” is neither a pure security issue nor an environmental issue. However,
environmental issues are often security concerns because, even without directly causing open
conflict, they can result in environmental perturbations or triggers that can destabilize the status
quo and result in a loss of regional, national, and local political, social, economic and personal
security (Schwartz and Randall 2003). Environmental security concerns can be grouped into
three general categories (AC/UNU Millennium Project): 
1) security of the environment which is a good in itself; 
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2) security from environmental change that can create societal instability and conflict; and, 
3)  security  from  environmental  change  (e.g.  water  scarcity,  air  pollution,  etc.)  that  would
threaten the material well-being of individuals. 
Common  elements  of  environmental  security  definitions  include:  public  safety  from
environmental  dangers  caused by natural  or  human processes due to  ignorance,  accident,
mismanagement, or design; amelioration of natural resource scarcity; maintenance of a healthy
environment; amelioration of environmental degradation; and, prevention of social disorder and
conflict (promotion of social stability) (Glenn et al. 1998).
Environmental security concerns include chemical/material releases to the environment. This is
because, worldwide, an estimated one quarter to one third of disease burden is attributable to
environmental factors (European Environment Agency 2003). Chemical or material releases to
the environment or environmental alteration result in actual or perceived health risks that can
result  in  societal  conflicts  between  parties  in  support  or  opposition  to  the  environmental
perturbation.
It is generally accepted that environmental security is a very broad term used to encompass a
wide variety of issues. For the purpose of this book, by  ensuring environmental security  we
mean  guarding  against  environmental  degradation  in  order  to  preserve  or  protect  human,
material, and natural resources at scales ranging from global to local. The critical infrastructure
concept  is  directly  linked  to  environmental  security.  For  environmental  applications,  critical
infrastructure may be defined as  manmade structures constructed and maintained to assure
human health, environmental protection, transportation networks, water supplies, clean air, food
supplies and other critical elements necessary to maintain economic and national security. The
question not yet fully addressed is how does one accommodate both the importance of critical
infrastructure and of environmental security, given the current risk assessment/risk management
paradigm? Many papers published in order to address different aspects of this issue. As the
fields of risk assessment, risk management, critical infrastructure, and environmental security
merge,  additional  discussions  will  need  to  occur  to  define  these  interactions  and  their
implications for environmental protection and regulatory activity.
2.3. Energy security and CIP
Security of supply is an important goal of energy policy in many countries around the world. The
three pillars of the European Union’s energy policy are efficiency, sustainability and security of
energy supplies (European Commission (EC) 2008; European Commission (EC) 2006) and a
few  years  before  his  election  as  President,  Barack  Obama  said:  ‘We  need  a  national
commitment to energy security, and to emphasize that commitment, we should install a Director
of Energy Security to oversee all of our efforts. ’’(Senator Barack Obama, February 28, 2006;
Governor’s  Ethanol  Coalition  Washington,  DC).  Based  on  the  literature  review  on  energy
security topics, we found that the common concept behind all energy security definitions is the
absence of, protection from or adaptability to threats that are caused by or have an impact on
the energy supply chain. Due to the difficulty of measuring all these threats at the same time,
individual authors implicitly or explicitly limit the concept of energy security along one or several
of the following dimensions: the sources of risk, the scope of the impact  measure, and different
severity filter such as the speed, size, sustention, spread, singular it y or sureness of impacts.
The choice of  conceptual  boundaries  has a large impact  on the results.  Depending on the
audience and the context of the analysis, further limitations of the concept may apply.
3. CONCLUSIONS
In terms of the security and future long term sustainability of the continuously expanding urban
areas of the world, addressing issues of urban resilience must be a priority for all involved in the
design and planning of  our cities.  The culmination of threats posed by global  terrorism and
natural  disasters,  together  with  such impending  issues as ‘peak oil’,  results  in  the need to
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proactively tackle matters concerning urban resilience. Having identified a means by which the
involved projects/policies can be advanced through the integration and development of existing
systems, this paper has sought to highlight the way forward in terms of urban resilience. The
primary outcome of an integrated approach, as outlined above, will be to: 
Facilitate a systematic approach to develop a security and resilience concept for a combination
of  complex and dynamic urban systems.  This  will  allow for  improved situational  awareness
across a collection of buildings or building complexes, resulting in the optimization of responses
to whatever situation may arise.
Deliver supporting tools for the design/planning stage of large scale urban built  infrastructure
development;  these tools will  have been tested and enhanced through the evaluation of the
quality case studies. This will result in the introduction of a set of new urban design criterion,
which  encompasses  the  values  of  urban  resilience.  This  will  ensure  that  urban  designers
embrace the need to consider services, security measures and infrastructure into their design,
to ensure a properly integrated environment and a viable finished vision of the design from the
outset.
Provide  an  integrated  approach  to  sharing  building  infrastructure  and  security  information
(building  operation  systems  traditionally  work  in  isolation)  including  critical  flows  of
materials/energy and sensor technologies etc, while recognizing the important role of security
culture  and  societal  acceptance  aspects.  This  will  also  see  the  introduction  of  integrated
systems, between complexes of buildings, which are designed to make exiting the wider urban
area safer in cases of emergency; this will be possible through the use of systems to adapt to
information from sensor technology and to identify the routes which are safe and highlight those
which are unsafe.
Furthermore, legislators and regulators for non-ICT critical sectors such as health, transport,
environmental  and energy should include cyber security aspects as an integral  part  of  their
regulatory frameworks in addition to the physical security and safety laws and regulation. This
may include security requirements for and standards on the devices with embedded ICT. It also
may include standards and regulations  for  the organisational  structure,  processes,  reporting
schemes, and information provision about security and privacy breaches to potentially affected
people and to the public.
Several  EU Seventh Framework Projects,  specifically  those relating to urban resilience and
security could be used to feed into EU policies, not least HARMONISE, VITRUV, RIBS and
DESURBS.  This  will  also  result  in  the  enhancement  of  the  pool  of  European  expertise  on
matters  of  urban  resilience.  The  improvement  of  the  design  of  urban  areas  and  systems,
increasing  their  security  against,  and resilience  to,  new threats,  will  be  the most  important
outcome  of  this  study.  Cities  hold  out  the  promise  of  concentrated  economic  dynamism,
predictable access to services, and opportunities for democratic citizenship.  Urbanization is a
transformative process to a large extent, synonymous with modernization, and development. In
most cases, as countries urbanize they become more advanced, more developed and more
prosperous.  The  development  of  integrated,  standardised,  harmonised  actions  by  bringing
together various actors (stakeholders like social  services,  operators,  manufacturers and law
enforcement) and leading joint efforts in the design and implementation of global joint initiatives,
will contribute towards a better and secure world.
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